Abstract. We generalize the cryptographic notion of Order Revealing Encryption (ORE) to arbitrary functions and we present a construction that allows to determine the (partial) ordering of two vectors i.e., given E(x) and E(y) it is possible to learn whether x = y, x > y, x < y or whether x and y are incomparable. This is the first non-trivial example of a Revealing Encryption (RE) scheme with output larger than one bit, and which does not rely on cryptographic obfuscation or multilinear maps.
Introduction
Computing on encrypted data is a promising approach to privacy preserving cloud computing. Using techniques such as (fully) homomorphic encryption [RAD78, Gen09] , a client can upload sensitive data on a partially untrusted cloud which can perform computation on the data without learning anything about the data, including the result of the computation. However in many applications it is desirable for the server to learn the result of the computation, so that the server can make decisions based on this result without further interaction with the client. Imagine as an example a server running an encrypted spam filter: using homomorphic encryption the server can, given an encrypted message, determine whether the message is spam or not but, since the server does not learn this bit, the server is unable to place the encrypted message in the user's spam folder.
Revealing Encryption. To solve the above class of problems a different kind of cryptographic primitive is needed, which we refer to as revealing encryption or RE. Intuitively, an RE scheme is an encryption scheme that allows to compute (selected) functions of the plaintexts by having access to the encrypted data only. In other words, given a target function f we want to construct an encryption scheme E and a public function F such that if X 1 = E(K, x 1 ) and X 2 = E(K, x 2 ) (for a random key K) then we have that F (X 1 , X 2 ) = f (x 1 , x 2 ).
Order Preserving Encryption. The first attempt towards building RE was taken by Agrawal et al. [AKSX04] when they introduced order preserving encryption (OPE), which using our language can be phrased as the very special case of RE where both f and F are numeric comparison. The "preserving" part of OPE is both a strength and a weakness: since f = F it is very easy to use OPE in practical applications (a client outsourcing an encrypted database using OPE does not even need to inform the server that the database is encrypted, as the database can compare encrypted data in the exact same way as it would compare plaintext data). Unfortunately preserving numeric ordering implies that OPE cannot achieve strong security guarantees, as shown by [BCLO09, BCO11] . To overcome this limitation order revealing encryption (ORE) was introduced by Boneh et al. [BLR + 15] . The main conceptual contributions of this paper is to generalize the notion of ORE to arbitrary functions (the formal definition of RE is given in Section 3).
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While the first (fully-secure) ORE schemes could only be instantiated using extremely heavy cryptographic tools (see below) and were therefore completely impractical, Chenette et al. [CLWW16] proposed a very elegant and simple construction of ORE which is extremely efficient in practice (at the price of leaking slightly more information than in the ideal case).
Obfuscation & Co. On the other end of the scale, it is trivial to construct secure RE for any function using ideal circuit obfuscation. In a nutshell, one can let F be an obfuscated circuit that takes as input two ciphertexts X 1 , X 2 , contains a (hardwired) secret key K, and outputs F (X 1 , X 2 ) = f (D(K, X 1 ), D(K, X 2 ))
i.e., the obfuscated program simply outputs the output of f evaluated on the result of the decryption of its inputs.
Unfortunately general purpose ideal obfuscation or even virtual black-box obfuscation does not exist [BGI + 01]. While a weaker notion of obfuscation (called indistinguishability obfuscation), might be plausibly instantiated under cryptographic assumptions (as shown by the fascinating research direction started by Garg et al. [GGH + 13]), it seems unlikely that this will turn into a practical solution in the foreseeable future. Note that using obfuscation it is possible to instantiate multiinput functional encryption (MIFE) [GGG + 14, BLR + 15, BKS16]: using MIFE, one can implement RE in a similar way as we sketched above, where the obfuscated program is replaced by a MIFE secret key sk f for the function f .
Note that despite the fact that MIFE implies RE, RE does not imply MIFE 3 . It is therefore plausible that RE can be instantiated more efficiently and under weaker assumptions than MIFE, and our results show that this is indeed the case.
Our Contributions. Given the state of affairs, it is natural to ask:
For which functions can we construct practically efficient revealing encryption (RE) schemes?
In this paper we begin answering the question by showing a construction of revealing encryption for partial order of vectors. This is a naturally interesting function motivated by concrete applications such as privacy-preserving skyline queries [BKS01, PTFS03] (or enhancing privacy in any other algorithm based on the partial order relation). In particular, given a dataset of d-dimensional vectors, the goal of a skyline query is to determine the set of dominating vectors. As a classic example, in a skyline query a client (e.g., a department committee) wants to evaluate a number of different offers (e.g., job candidates for a faculty position) based on a set of incomparable parameters (e.g., teaching experience, research output, funding, etc.). In this case the department committee is interested in evaluating all candidates for which there does not exist another candidate who is better qualified under all parameters, which is exactly the output of a skyline query. Using RE it is possible to compute the output of a skyline query by performing the partial-comparison directly in the encrypted domain i.e., without having to first decrypt the vectors. We note that there are plenty of protocols and algorithms in the computer science literature which use the partial ordering relation (lattice-based access control, timestamps based on vector clocks, topological ordering, etc.), and we therefore believe that the notion of RE for partial order is as natural as the case of RE for the total order relation.
Note that the notion of revealing encryption has also been independently introduced by Joye and Passelgue [JP16] . (Interestingly, we came to the notion of RE by generalizing ORE while they reached the same notion by simplifying 2-input FE). In their work they present RE constructions for functions different than those considered in this paper, including: comparison (ORE), orthogonality testing and cardinality of intersection.
Technical Overview. The starting point of our solution is the recent ORE scheme of Chenette et al. [CLWW16] . In this scheme, a value x ∈ {0, 1} n is encrypted using n evaluations of a pseudorandom function (PRF) F K for key K, i.e., for each index i = 1, . . . , n the encryption algorithm outputs a value
where prefix(x, i) is the function that outputs the i most significant bits of x, x i is the ith most significant bit, and where + is integer addition. Now, take two values x and y and let i * be the largest index such that
i.e., i * is the smallest index such that x i * = y i * . Then the first i * − 1 ciphertexts will be identical for both x, y (since the PRF is evaluated on exactly the same value, and the added bit is the same), while the i * -th ciphertext will be "in the right order" (since the PRF is evaluated on exactly the same value but in only one of the two cases 1 will be added) and therefore one can compare x and y by finding the first ciphertext component in which the encryptions differ and perform a simple numerical comparison of this value. For security, note that the bottom n − i * − 1 ciphertexts will be independently random since the PRF is evaluated on different values. Therefore, the scheme reveals the order as well as the first position in which the value differs. A very recent work shows that it is possible to limit this leakage [CLOZ16] , but unfortunately their construction requires heavy public key operations (we believe that similar techniques could be applied to our scheme as well).
In a nutshell, we generalize the construction presented by Chenette et al. [CLWW16] in the following way: consider for simplicity the 2-dimensional case x = (x 1 , x 2 ). Then for each pair of indices i, j we compute
where α i,j is a carefully chosen function that allows to perform the comparison between two vectors in such a way that no information is leaked when the vectors are incomparable. The main challenge in coming up with the right function α, is that we are trying to encode a non-binary output (i.e., x = y, x > y, x < y, or incomparable) into a binary relation (i.e., the numerical comparison between the scalars α(x) and α(y)). Details of the constructions are given in Section 4 and in Section 5 we give a performance analysis of our scheme.
Revealing Encryption Beyond Partial Ordering. We think that discovering which functions admit revealing encryption schemes is an exciting and important future research direction. In Appendix C, we discuss simple (unconditionally secure) examples of revealing encryptions for absolute distance and for hamming distance (which unfortunately is only secure for a limited number of queries).
Other related work. During recent years, OPE and ORE have been active research areas: Bun and Zhandry [BZ16] have studied the connection between ORE and differentially private learning [DMNS06, KLN + 11]. Concurrent with this work, Lewi and Wu [LW16] presented a new and efficient ORE construction based on the work of Chenette et al. [CLWW16] . This construction splits the message in blocks (i.e. a sequence of bits) and the scheme leaks the position of the first block in which the messages differ. Roche et al. [RACY16] proposed a new primitive called partial order preserving encoding, which achieves ideal OPE security (IND-OCPA [BCLO09] ) while providing fast insertion and search in an encrypted database. Furthermore, interactive OPE [PLZ13, KS14, Ker15] was introduced to achieve stronger security guarantees (like ideal security) for OPE schemes. In these schemes, ciphertexts are mutable, meaning that whenever a new value is encrypted the existing ciphertexts can be updated.
During the last couple of decades there has been a long line of work concerning encryption schemes, where either the ciphertexts preserve some information about the underlying messages or it is possible to perform a public test that reveals some information about the encrypted data: searchable encryption [SWP00, GSW04, BBO07, BHJP14] allows users to outsource their data in a private manner, while maintaining the possibility to do efficient search over it. Variants of searchable encryption are public-key encryption with keyword search [BCOP03, CGKO06] . All these encryption schemes deal with payload privacy, user privacy, computation on outsourced encrypted data, fine-grained access control on data, etc.
Finally, in Appendix D, we review the (in)security of some existing systems which offer alternative solutions to privacy-preserving skyline queries.
Preliminaries
For n, n 1 , n 2 ∈ N, let [n 1 : n 2 ] be the set {n 1 , n 1 + 1, . . . , n 2 − 1, n 2 } and [n] be the set [1 : n]. For x ∈ Z, let |x| denote the absolute value of x. Let x ← $ S denote that x is sampled uniform random from the set S.
Definition 1 (Pseudorandom Function). We say that F :
with O 0 a uniform random function and O 1 = F K for some key K ∈ {0, 1} κ .
We interpret x ∈ {0, 1} n both as a string of bits i.e. x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and as an integer x = n−1 i=0 2 i x n−i i.e., x 1 is the most significant bit of x. Given such an x and an index i ∈ [n] it is convenient to define the function prefix :
so that prefix(x, 0) = (0 n , 0), prefix(x, 1) = (x 1 , 0 n−1 , 1) and so on. Note that prefix has the useful property that for all x ∈ {0, 1} n prefix(
Given two strings x, y ∈ {0, 1} n we define pos(x, y) to return the largest i such that prefix(x, i − 1) = prefix(y, i−1) or equivalently the smallest i such that x i = y i . If x = y, then we define pos(x, y) to output n + 1.
Revealing Encryption
In this section we formally define Revealing Encryption (RE).
Authorized Function. Let M be the input space and I the output space, then a RE scheme is parametrized by -ary authorized function
Revealing Encryption. Given an authorized function f , a RE scheme for f is a triple of algorithms Π f = (Setup, Enc, Eval) defined as follows:
Setup: On input the security parameter κ, the randomized algorithm Setup outputs a secret key sk and the public parameters pp. Encryption: On input a message m ∈ M and a secret key sk, the randomized algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext c. Eval: On input ciphertexts {c i = Enc(sk, m i )} i∈[ ] and the public parameters pp, the Eval algorithm outputs f (m 1 , . . . , m ) ∈ I.
Remark 1. Note that here and in the rest of the paper we do not mention the decryption algorithm, since any RE can be enhanced to allow for decryption by appending an IND-CPA secure encryption to the RE ciphertext.
Definition 2 (Correctness). Let f be an authorized function and κ be the security parameter. Let Π f = (Setup, Enc, Eval) be a RE scheme for f . We say that Π f is correct if for all messages {m i } i∈[ ] ∈ M the following probability
is negligible in κ, where (sk, pp) ← Setup(1 κ ) and the probabilities are taken over the random coins of all algorithms.
Leakage Function. Following the work of Chenette et al. [CLWW16] , our definition also allows for a leakage function L : M * → {0, 1} * that exactly characterizes the information leaked by our constructions. In the best case L({m i } i∈[q] ) outputs f ({m j } j∈S ) for every subset S ⊂ [q] of size , and in this case we talk about optimal leakage. Note that the work of Chenette et al. leaks extra information as well (the first digit at which two integers x, y are different) and our main construction inherits this leakage.
Definition 3 (Security, [CLWW16] ). Let κ be the security parameter, let q ∈ N, and let f be an authorized function. Let Π f = (Setup, Enc, Eval) be a RE scheme for f . Consider the following experiments, where A = (A 1 , . . . , A q ) is an adversary, S = (S 0 , . . . , S q ) is a simulator, and L(·) is a leakage function.
Security Experiments
. . , mi)); 5. output (c1, . . . , cq) and stA;
We say that Π f is a q-secure RE scheme wrt L(·) if for all adversaries A that makes no more thanueries, there exists a simulator S such that the output distributions of the two experiments are computationally indistinguishable
We say a scheme is simply secure if it is q-secure for every q = poly(κ).
Definition 3 captures the requirement that given an a priori bounded number of ciphertexts, the adversary should not be able to learn more than the allowed leakage. The security experiments formalize this requirement by creating the challenge ciphertexts either as real encryptions of the adversarial chosen plaintexts or simulated based on the allowed leakage of the adversarial chosen plaintexts. Note that the output of the experiment contains an arbitrary output from the adversary (i.e., st A ), which is a very conservative way of allowing the adversary to output any information that might be useful to distinguish between the ideal experiment and the real experiment.
Partial Order Revealing Encryption (PORE)
In this section, we present a construction of revealing encryption for partial ordering of vectors. For the sake of presentation, we will start by showing our construction in the 2-dimensional case (which already requires a significant amount of notation and indices). In Appendix B, we generalize to the multidimensional case. Let M = {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n be the message domain, and the authorized function for a 2-dimensional PORE is
we define a function that determines the order
Then we can define the authorized function as
which means that
We will prove the security of our scheme with respect to the following leakage function (with f as defined above and pos as defined in Section 2):
i.e. the construction reveals the order as well as the first position in which each coordinate differ. Given a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ , we define the following four functions:
where given a plaintext m = (x, y) ∈ M and two indices i, j ∈ [n + 1] we define
On a high level, the construction works as follows: given a point m = (x, y) and a key K for the pseudorandom function F , then the ciphertext consist of a two-dimensional matrix cm ∈ {0, 1, 2} (n+1)×(n+1) and two bit strings bx, by ∈ {0, 1} n (i.e. one bit string for each entry in the point). These bit strings are constructed to fulfil the property: given encryptions of two points, we can for each entry (x and y) determine at which position they differ, but without revealing the order. These positions can then be used to look up an entry in the matrix cm, which will determine the partial order of the two points.
Construction 1 Fix a security parameter κ ∈ N. We define a PORE scheme for two dimensions Π PORE = (Setup, Enc, Eval) as follows Setup: On input κ ∈ N, sample and output a key K ← $ {0, 1} κ .
Encryption: Given a point m = (x, y) ∈ M and a secret key K compute for all i, j ∈ [n + 1]
where α is a function defined as follows
Then, output the ciphertext C = (cm, bx, by), where
n Evaluation: On input two ciphertexts
Compute pos(bx (1) , bx (2) ) = x and pos(by (1) , by (2) ) = y . If x = n + 1 and y = n + 1, the algorithm outputs (1, 1) (since m (1) = m (2) ). Otherwise, lookup the two entries cm
(1)
x, y and cm (2)
x, y and compute
Next, the algorithm branches on the value of t:
-Otherwise output (0, 0), since the two points are incomparable.
Correctness. Let m (1) = (x (1) , y (1) ) and m (2) = (x (2) , y (2) ) be two plaintexts such that
(i.e. x (1) and x (2) differ at position x and y (1) and y (2) differ at position y ). We consider the encryptions of these messages
We first argue that bx
for i < x . This is easy to see:
Since by definition of x we know that ∀i < x , prefix(x (1) , i − 1) = prefix(x (2) , i − 1) and x
i . The same can be argued about the y part. We then argue that if x < n + 1, then there ∃i < n + 1 such that bx
i . This is easy to see since by definition of x the output of prefix is the same but x
So, we turn our attention to the comparison between cm
x, y and cm
x, y by computing
Note that by definition of x , y , the output of prefix is the same for both ciphertexts and therefore the output of F 2,K is the same so we can rewrite this as
We now have the following cases:
1. x < n + 1 ∧ y < n + 1: In this case we know that x
y , which means that we are either in the case (comparable)
In the comparable case we have that one of the α is 1 and the other is 0. When we are in the case m (1) < m (2) (i.e. the first of the two comparable cases), then we have that α(m (1) , ( x , y )) = 0 and α(m (2) , ( x , y )) = 1, thus t = −1 and the evaluation algorithm will output (1, 0) meaning that m (1) < m (2) . Similar, we argue that the evaluation algorithm correctly outputs (0, 1) (since t = 1) when m (1) > m (2) .
In the incomparable case we have that t = 0 since the value z i,j is the same in both cases (since as argued before prefix's output is the same and so is F 1,K 's output). 2. x = n + 1 ∧ y < n + 1: following a similar reasoning in this case x 3. x < n + 1 ∧ y = n + 1: following a similar reasoning in this case x and by definition the evaluation algorithm will output (1, 1) meaning that the two messages are equal.
Security
To prove the security of the construction, we present a simulator that constructs the ciphertexts based on information provided by the leakage function and the previous generated ciphertext. On a high level the simulator works as follows: each component of the ciphertext C (i) is generated using the leakage L (m (1) , . . . , m (i) ). For each j < i, the leakage reveals at which position x (resp.
t with s < x and t < y , the content of the entry will be equivalent to (some of) the previous generated ciphertexts (which are contained in the state of the simulator), since the encryption algorithm uses a pseudorandom function. Finally, for each entry cm t with s > x and t > y , the content of the entry will be generated uniformly at random, since the corresponding input to the pesudorandom function has never been used before.
Simulator. Denote the adversarial chosen message as m (1) , · · · , m (q) , where
Initially, simulator S 0 is empty and S 1 sets C (1) = (cm (1) , bx (1) , by (1) ), where cm (1) , bx (1) , by (1) are all drawn uniformly at random. Furthermore, it sets the state st S = (C (1) ). Next, define the simulator S i (for 2 ≤ i ≤ q) as in Figure 1 . Theorem 1. The RE scheme Π PORE from Construction 1 is secure with leakage function L.
The complete proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A.
Efficiency of PORE
In this section we analyze the efficiency of our PORE construction.
Theoretical Efficiency
Let κ be the security parameter, d the number of dimensions and n the bit length of each entry. Then we can compute the storage and computational complexity of our scheme.
Storage Complexity. The bit length of a ciphertext in our PORE scheme is exactly:
Computational Overhead. Performing an encryption requires 2(n + 1)
calls to a PRF (with unbounded domain). Note that running the evaluation algorithm requires no invocation of the PRF (only d binary searches into vectors of n bits each and a single addition modulo 3).
(
For each t ∈ [n] define entry by t + 1 mod 2. 9. Else set by
Output C (i) = (cm (i) , bx (i) , by (i) ) and st S = (C (1) , . . . , C (i) ). 
Implementation Choices
In this section we describe the result of our experimental validation of the efficiency of our PORE scheme.
Plaintext Space. We have implemented our scheme for a range of parameters d and n. We report here the results for all combinations (d, n) with d ∈ {2, . . . , 8} and n = 2 i for i ∈ {1, . . . , 13} s.t. the ciphertext size is less than 20MB.
PRF Choice. We implement the PRF F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ using AES-CBC mode, with key size κ = 128 bits. This is a particularly convenient choice thanks to the AES native instruction in modern CPUs.
Note that in the theoretical analysis we stated that the complexity of the encryption is O(n d ) when measured as the number of calls to a PRF with unbounded domain. However in practice, when instantiating F with AES in CBC mode the running time (in terms of number of calls to AES) grows linearly with the number of blocks needed for the plaintext, namely dn/128 . Therefore, a naïve implementation would be significantly slower than promised. We notice, however, that thanks to the special structure of the inputs of our PRF it is possible to get rid of this extra factor. In particular, we note that in our matrix of ciphertexts we evaluate the PRF on inputs of the form
where each value prefix(x k , i k ) is given as input to n different PRFs. Therefore we modify the way we evaluate the PRF by first precomputing
and then implement
so that the inputs to F 0 K is of fixed length 128. Therefore (even adding the O(n 2 d) extra AES invocations on "long" n-bit values used to precompute the u's), the total number of calls to AES and hence the running time is O(n d ) as initially promised.
Note, the XOR operation over d strings takes O(d) time. However, the points which are in the same position in the first k dimensions shares the value u 1,i 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ u k,i k . By making these values reusable, we can reduce the amortized complexity to
Experimental Setup
The reported encryption timings (Table 1 ) are the average taken over 100 executions of the encryption algorithm. For the evaluation timings (Table 2) , we randomly pick 500 pairs from the 100 ciphertexts and take the average of the 500 executions of the evaluation algorithm. To measure the size of the ciphertexts (Table 3) , we keep track of the size of the required space each time the encryption algorithm applies the memory.
Hardware. The experiments were executed on a machine with the following characteristics:
-OS: Linux TitanX1 3.19.0-15-generic #15-Ubuntu SMP -CPU: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2675 v3 1.80GHz -Memory: 128GB -GCC: gcc version 4.9.2 (Ubuntu 4.9.2-10ubuntu13) (Compile option -O2)
Results
Encryption Complexity. Table 1 shows how long it takes to encrypt a single plaintext for different values of d and n. As expected, we observe that the encryption time grows as the dimension d and bit lengths n increases.
Evaluation Complexity. Note that the theoretically complexity of the evaluation algorithm is O(d). However, the actual running time of the evaluation algorithm from Table 2 indicates that the algorithm is so fast that for most choices of parameters it is hard to appreciate the theoretical complexity.
When the combined size of all 100 ciphertext from the experiments does not exceed 6MB (i.e. each ciphertext does not exceed 60kB), then all ciphertexts fits inside the L2 cache of the CPU. By observing the variation of the evaluation timings in Table 2 and the ciphertext size in  Table 3 , we can conclude that there is a tendency that when the ciphertexts fits inside the L2 cache, then the variation stays below 0.07 µs (this observation is indicated in the tables by splitting the columns in two). 
Conclusion
In this work, we introduced a generalization of order-revealing encryption (ORE) called revealing encryption (RE), which is an encryption scheme that allows to compute a (selected) function f of the plaintexts given only the encrypted data. We adopt the simulation-based security notion presented by Chenette et al. [CLWW16] , which define security with respect to a leakage function. This enables one to determine the exact information that the ciphertexts leak about the underlying messages (which will always include the function f evaluated on all possible ciphertexts).
Revealing encryption is of special interest in relation to applications like computation or queries on outsourced encrypted data. However, these encryption schemes leak potentially sensitive information about the encrypted data depending on the actual application in which RE is used. This means that before using RE in a concrete application one should make a proper analysis to understand whether the leakage provided is problematic or not. A recent line of work has been concerned with attacking applications built on top of this kind of encryption schemes [NKW15,  
A Proof of Theorem 1
In the proof we replace the pseudorandom function F with a truly random function g : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ , and we define the following four functions
These functions fulfil the following property, which follows directly from the definition of the functions g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , prefix and pos.
Lemma 1. For all points m (1) = (x (1) , y (1) ) and m (2) = (x (2) , y (2) ) in M, if pos(m (1) , m (2) ) = ( x , y ), then for all i ≤ x and all j ≤ y it holds that
Proof (of Theorem 1). We prove that the simulator defined in Figure 1 generates ciphertexts, which are indistinguishable from the actual ciphertexts. We start by defining a series of hybrid games:
, where the ciphertexts are generated by the encryption algorithm. H 1 : Same as H 0 , except we replace the PRF F with a truly random function g (i.e. we replace F 1,K , . . . , F 4,K with g 1 , . . . , g 4 ).
H 2 : The ideal experiment: IDEAL PORE A,S,L (κ), where the ciphertexts are generated by the simulator S.
From the definition of pseudorandom function it is given that H 1 is indistinguishable from H 0 (the real experiment). Next, we prove by induction that the ciphertexts (C (1) , · · · , C (q) ) generated by the simulator have the same distribution as the ciphertexts ( C (1) , · · · , C (q) ) generated by H 1 (i.e. that H 1 is indistinguishable from H 2 ). From the construction of hybrid H 1 , we notice that the distribution of cm i,j , bx i and by i are independent of each other for all i, j ∈ [n + 1]. Thus, to prove that the distributions are indistinguishable, we can look at each part separately (i.e. we look at each of the nine cases defined in the simulator, separately).
In the base case of the induction we show that C (1) is indistinguishable from C (1) : note that the simulator chooses each part of C (1) uniformly random, while in hybrid H 1 each part of C (1) is computed using the truly random function g with fresh inputs to each evaluation. Thus, we can conclude that C (1) is indistinguishable from C (1) (note that we do not need to consider the leakage, since we only have one ciphertext and thus not enough to perform an evaluation).
Assume that (C (1) , . . . , C (i−1) ) (generated by the simulator) is indistinguishable from ( C (1) , . . . , C (i−1) ) (generated by the H 1 ) for some 1 < i q. Then, we prove that
and
, by (i) ) are indistinguishable distributed. Denote the adversarial chosen message by m (i) = (x (i) , y (i) ) for i = 1, . . . , q. For all j < i, let ( 
From the definition of the simulator (in Figure 1 ) it is given that cm
s,t , and by assumption we have C (j) ∼ C (j) , which means that cm (s, t) ). The relation between cm 
Thus, by Lemma 1 we get that that cm
By the definition of the simulator (see Figure 1 ) and the assumption that C (j) ∼ C (j) , we can conclude that cm s,t are indistinguishable in all three cases. 3. Else ∀j < i, we consider the remaining cases
s,t is uniformly random, since at least one of the inputs to g 2 has never been used before.
t . Thus, exactly one of α(m (i) , (s, t)) and α(m (j) , (s, t)) is random, and the other one is fixed. 5
Thus, we can conclude that cm 
Thus, by the definition of the simulator and the assumption that C (j) ∼ C (j) , we can conclude that bx
s and bx
s are indistinguishable. 5. Else if ∃j < i such that
s , and by the definition of hybrid H 1 we have
Thus, we can conclude that bx
s , which implies that
By the definition of the simulator and the assumption that C (j) ∼ C (j) , we can conclude that
s are indistinguishable. 6. Else ∀j < i, we have that (j)
x < s. In this case, the input to g 3 has never appeared before, thus bx in by (i) the arguments follow closely the arguments for case 4-6. Thus, C (i) and C (i) are indistinguishable, if (C (1) , . . . , C (i−1) ) and ( C (1) , . . . , C (i−1) ) are indistinguishable distributed. By induction, we can conclude that the simulator generates a distribution, which is indistinguishable from the one generated by H 1 .
B d-dimensional PORE
In this section we will generalize the 2-dimensional construction from Section 4 into d dimensions: the matrix cm will be extended from 2 dimensions to d dimensions, and instead of two n-bit string, we now have d n-bit strings bx 1 , . . . , bx d . Thus, given two ciphertexts C (1) = (cm (1) , bx 
d ) ∈ M we define a function that determines the order
Then we can define the authorized function similar to the 2-dimensional case:
We will prove the security of our scheme with respect to the following leakage function (similar to the one defined for the 2-dimensional case):
Given a pseudorandom function F : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ , we define the following d + 2 functions:
where given a plaintext m = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) ∈ M and d indices i 1 , . . . , i d ∈ [n + 1] we define
Construction 2 Fix a security parameter κ ∈ N. We define a PORE for d-dimensional points Π PORE = (Setup, Enc, Eval) as follows Setup: On input κ ∈ N, sample and output a key K ← $ {0, 1} κ . Encryption: Given a point m = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) ∈ M and a secret key K. Compute for all i 1 , . . . , i d ∈ [n + 1]:
Then output C = (cm, bx 1 , . . . , bx d ), where
Evaluation: On input two ciphertexts
1 , . . . , bx
, the algorithm outputs (1, 1) (since m (1) = m (2) ). Otherwise, lookup the entry defined by 1 , . . . , d in cm (1) and cm (2) , and compute
-Otherwise output (0, 0), since the two points are incomparable. 
Thus, we can identify the entry (l 1 , . . . , l d ) in cm (1) and cm (2) that determines the partial order of the vectors. Next, we can do the same case analysis as in the proof for 2 dimensions by a natural extensions to d dimensions.
B.1 Security.
The security proof of the d-dimensional PORE scheme is a direct generalization of the security proof for the 2-dimensional PORE.
Simulator. Denote the adversarial chosen message as m (1) , . . . , m (q) , where
Initially, simulator S 0 is empty, and simulator S 1 sets C (1) = cm (1) , bx
, where
are all drawn uniformly at random. Furthermore, it sets st S = (C (1) ). Define the simulator S i (for 2 ≤ i ≤ q) as in Figure 2 .
Theorem 2. The RE scheme Π PORE from Construction 2 is secure with leakage function L.
6 Given i1, . . . , i d , the set S contains all the k's such that i k ≤ n.
C Revealing Encryption For Other Functions
In this section we present some ideas for constructing simple revealing encryption schemes for other natural functions.
C.1 Hamming distance
Given a plaintext space {0, 1} n , we define a RE scheme for the function f : {0,
where d H (x, y) = |{x j = y j |j ∈ Z n }| is the Hamming distance between the bit vectors x and y.
Our construction is as follows: the setup algorithm outputs pp = n and sk = (π, r), where π : [n] → [n] is a random permutation and r ← $ {0, 1} n is a random n-bit string. The encryption algorithm on input m ∈ {0, 1} n outputs c = Enc(sk, m) = m π(1) , . . . , m π(n) ⊕ r (i.e. we permute the bits of the message m and XOR the result with a random value r). Given two ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 the evaluation algorithm outputs Eval(pp, c 1 , c 2 ) = d H (c 1 , c 2 )
Note that when computing the Hamming distance between the two ciphertexts, the random value r will cancel out. This leaves the permuted plaintexts, which has the same Hamming distance as the original plaintexts. Thus, the scheme enjoys correctness. Next, the scheme can be proven secure according to the following leakage function for q ≤ 3 The simulator then proceeds by picking random ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c q under the condition that T (m 1 , . . . , m q ) = T (c 1 , . . . , c q ). Then it can be proven that c 1 , . . . , c q is indistinguishable from real encryptions of messages m 1 , . . . , m q under leakage function L * . Finally, we can prove that for q ≤ 3 the information leaked by L * can be computed given the information leaked by L.
Insecurity when q > 3. We will now give a concrete example of why leakage function L is not enough for q > 3. For two different set of queried messages {m 1 , . . . , m q } and {m 1 , . . . , m q } with the same leakage under L, they can have different structure of T . For example (for q = 4): , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 ) . Thus, the two sets of queries have different structure, which for q > 3 cannot be computed given only the information provided by leakage function L.
C.2 Difference Revealing Encryption
Modular Difference. Given a plaintext space Z n (for any integer n), it is easy to see that one-time pad encryption, with key re-use, is a perfectly secure RE scheme for the function f : Z n × Z n → Z n f (x, y) = x − y mod n In particular, let k ← Z n be a random key and pp = n, then given a plaintext m i ∈ Z n c i = Enc(k, m i ) = m i + k mod n Given two ciphertexts c i , c j it is now possible to compute In the paper, the following parameters are suggested: |q| = 1024, |Φ| = 2048 and |r| = 512. This encryption scheme is unfortunately not secure: given a ciphertext C, we can determine whether C encrypts x by computing a = (C − x ) · (Φ −1 mod q) = r + (x − x ) · Φ −1 mod q.
If x = x then a = r, which means that a will be small (i.e. a ≤ 2 512 with probability 1), while in all other cases a will be large (i.e., a > 2 512 with overwhelming probability). Thus, the system does not satisfy IND-CPA security.
